In 2015, the Heads of State and Government of COMESA, the EAC and SADC agreed to establish the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) extending from Cape to Cairo, encompassing all twenty-six members of the three groupings. While the TFTA negotiations are ongoing, it is necessary that member states are aware of their rights and obligations as well as the nature and power of the organs of the TFTA. This paper analyses dispute resolution bodies of the three regional economic communities making up the large trade bloc, in order to distil the most salient features which allow for effective dispute resolution. The study shows that it is necessary that regional judiciaries be allowed to operate independently and efficiently without undue interference from political elites, otherwise they stand to fail in executing their mandate.
II INTRODUCTION
Regional integration refers to the outcome of processes, including cooperative arrangements, the implementation of intergovernmental treaties and market-led processes, through which economies of countries in a region become more closely interconnected.
1 These outcomes are essential to building markets, creating robust and diverse economies, increasing opportunities for growth, and attracting new sources of investment finance. Regional integration allows for economies of scale, promotes intra-regional trade and ensures that regional bodies have a greater role in global economic governance. If well and truly grounded in the socio-economic realities in which member states operate, regional integration is more likely to succeed and enhance the trade liberalisation agenda. 2 However, it can pose serious dangers, especially given the multiple membership regional integration models prevailing at present. These multiple commitments can also lead to jurisdictional conflict and non-compliance. features of dispute settlement in these communities to inform future trade dispute settlement measures. Finally, the fifth section consolidates the points raised and uses them as a basis for providing concrete recommendations for the TFTA dispute settlement mechanism.
'The presence of multiple regional courts with overlapping functions and jurisdiction may by itself defeat the whole purpose of establishing the respective regional organisations as economic zones to spearhead and accelerate the growth and economy of the people. It is not an incentive to foreign investors, who prefer certainty and predictability of decisions in the event a dispute emerges calling for judicial intervention. In this kind of situation there is no certainty or predictability, especially given

III THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AND REGIONALISM (a) WTO Rules on Regional Integration
The legal provisions which regulate the formation and subsistence of regional trade agreements lie in a number of WTO Agreements: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and the Agreement on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and the
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause).
Article XXIV of the GATT sets out how RTAs should operate. There are three major obligations in this regard: both internal and external trade requirements as well as a notification responsibility. In order for an RTA to pass WTO muster, it should seek to reduce substantially all barriers to trade amongst its members. 4 Barriers to trade in respect of non-RTA members who are also WTO members must not be more restrictive than those obtaining prior to the conclusion of the RTA.
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The WTO has to be notified of the intention to create an RTA, subject to review by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). 6 The Enabling Clause provides for special and differential treatment for developing countries as long as the notification procedure is followed. In addition, no added 4 Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994. 5 Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994. 6 Article XXIV:7 of the GATT 1994. barriers to trade should be created following such treatment. With respect to trade in services, Article V of the GATS provides for essentially the same requirements as obtain under GATT Article XXIV. However, arguments have been raised to the effect that the GATS is more lenient in its regional integration requirements than the GATT. 7 While it is useful to have these arrangements in place, they are not without their faults. The CRTA has never come to a consensus regarding the compliance of any RTA which it has been asked to take notice of. 8 In addition, the notification procedure does not seem to be working well. For instance, the Tripartite Free Trade
Area is under negotiation in Africa, yet no notification procedures have as yet been implemented. Members often notify the CRTA after the formation of the RTA or choose not to make a notification at all. 9 This limits the formation of RTAs in that the procedure is only effective insofar as states choose to comply. However, attempts have been made to improve the rules pertaining to regional trade agreements.
10 Nevertheless, the prescriptions described above are useful in delineating the limits within which an RTA will be recognised. Despite its shortcomings, the monitoring and compliance mechanism offered by the CRTA is necessary in reigning in rogue elements in the multilateral trading system. reason for developing country participation in these arrangements may be the need to move away from a developed country dominated multilateral trading system to one in which they have a multi-polar trade regime.
Initially, the WTO encouraged the formation of RTAs because it was envisaged that they would be useful building blocks for the multilateral trading system. This is evident in the fact that free trade areas and customs unions were sanctioned since the formation of the GATT in 1947. The provisions of the GATT 1947 relating to RTAs were imported into the GATT 1994. Customs unions were deemed to be similar to single countries in trade negotiations as they maintained a common external tariff against non-members. 16 However, questions began to arise relating to whether RTAs created or diverted trade.
Trade creation involves the generation of gains when consumers are able to purchase from the cheapest and most competitive source of supply. This occurs when RTA members switch from inefficient domestic producers and import from more efficient producers from other members of the RTA. 17 Conversely, trade diversion occurs when members switch imports from low-cost production in the multilateral system and import more from higher-cost producers in the partner Essentially, this means that the proponents of the TFTA envision a development through trade outcome. This is not much different from the vision of African statesmen since the inception of the OAU, however, at present, the discussion had been enlarged to include greater competitiveness for the region as well as a better negotiating position. The overarching goal of the three regional organisations is to expand trade, alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life of the population of the Member States. The TFTA is also an effort to rationalise the problem of overlapping memberships of the RECs in the region. COMESA has 19 Member States of which eight are also members of SADC and four of the EAC; the EAC has five members, with four being members of COMESA and one a member of SADC; and lastly, SADC has 15 members, eight of which belong to COMESA as well and one to the EAC.
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The TFTA negotiations were launched on 12 June 2011 at the Second Tripartite Summit. The Tripartite process will adopt a three-pronged approach based on market integration in the TFTA, infrastructure development and industrial development. 31 The negotiations are to take place in two phases: (i) trade in goods and (ii) the free movement of business persons in two separate but parallel tracks;
followed by (ii) services, intellectual property rights, competition policy and traderelated areas. 32 Even as the negotiating agenda may be laudable, it is disheartening to note that the negotiating strategy is not being pushed at REC level, but rather at 30 the individual country plane. The TFTA Agreement was signed on June 10 2015.
While negotiations as to the meat of the AGrement are ongoing, it is necessary to look at the implications that its establishment has on trade relations not only among member states, but also between the proposed block and external partners.
Granted, the Draft Agreement is merely "a draft", however, negotiations are moving forward based on its contents and it is likely to form a huge bulk of the final agreement upon signature at a future date. where there is clarity in terms of rules of engagement. This is not to say that political will is not important in state relations, however, at the most basic level of state interaction, lucid regulations assist in state practice.
Effective dispute resolution and implementation of decisions will aid in this process.
Indeed, former Director General of the WTO, Michael Moore, said that 'dispute settlement is the backbone of a multilateral trading system'. 36 With a dispute settlement mechanism, the commitments that states make in trade agreements are 33 Article 50 of the Draft Tripartite Agreement provides that the Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by two thirds of the members the trading bloc. 34 relates to the benefits stemming from the alliance, but also the practical reality around issues of compliance and the enforcement of agreements.
V PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (a) Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution
The fact that the TFTA is a rules-based agglomeration is advantageous in that it is clear what members ought to adhere to in terms of their rights and obligations. Just as the WTO system is plain in its trade liberalisation and non-discrimination ethos, clear rules will allow member states to conduct themselves according to the dictates of the TFTA Agreement. 37 This is also useful given the fact that while states are in principle equal in international law, the reality is something different altogether. A rules-based approach allows even weaker states to experience somewhat the same equality and participation at the multilateral level. 38 An institution designed for the resolution of disputes must subsist for there to be a practical dimension to the dispute settlement understanding. It is not enough to have rules without an adjudication process separate from the day to day operation of an 37 The trade liberalisation agenda of the WTO rests on the standard of non-discrimination, which is amplified in two principles: most-favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) -Articles I and III of the GATT. organisation. An independent judicial arm will ensure that states comply with the mandate of the organisation. 39 Rules of procedure are also very important as they will determine the adjudication of disputes and how decisions will be implemented.
The manner in which disputes are resolved is also instrumental in the determination of the effectiveness of a dispute resolution mechanism. Under the GATT, consultations and diplomatic efforts were used to resolve disputes. 40 In the WTO, the dispute settlement mechanism outlines powers, procedures and outcomes in the realm of trade dispute resolution. 41 There are 4 major steps in the WTO dispute an effect and acquire the respect and recognition they deserve, enforcement should be seen to not only be possible, but also effective. 44 The WTO dispute settlement system may not be the best, however, it is certainly the most instructive when it comes to the resolution of disputes in the area of international trade. 45 It is not a standard according to which all other trade dispute settlement bodies should function, but rather a useful springboard from which the debate on trade dispute settlement at the regional level can be launched.
(b) Challenges Faced by the RECs
The question of increased markets through regional integration has always been high on the agenda of the three RECs. This is primarily because of the low levels of industrialisation that result in countries trading in primary or simple manufactured products, asymmetric product complementarities in the region, and the small While there seems to be substantial support and enthusiasm for the TFTA across the wider region, political will and commitment to its implementation is a different issue.
This problem has long manifested itself in the individual RECs, and is mostly attributed to the unwillingness by African states to cede any amount of sovereignty to a regional entity and to the prioritisation of domestic interests over regional ones.
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The rhetoric of political will in favour of integration has not been sufficiently met with the requisite action.
In the preparations for the TFTA, it has been reported that countries have been missing meetings and have also been late in submitting their responses to documents. 58 It is likely that the issue of tariff liberalisation will also meet with some resistance from domestic constituencies, particularly in protected industries, and this will have significant impact on the commitment to liberalise. Coupled with the issue of political will and commitment in general is that of political instability in the regiona factor which TFTA Member States will have to contend with as it affects trade. parties standing before regional courts allows for greater justice to be served. Given the fact that Africa has a large informal business sector, allowing individuals to approach the tribunals for the redress of international trade disputes would be a positive step. It would be ideal as well to incorporate the exhaustion of local remedies in the TFTA prior to instituting proceedings at the regional level.
In procedures that were employed for the amendments. 92 The EACJ concluded that the ratification process that was used in making the amendments constituted an infringement of the amendment rules in the Treaty because the private sector and civil society were not consulted during the drafting of the amendments. However, the court cautioned that despite the lack of procedurally sound enactment, the amendments were in line with the Treaty's objectives.
In James Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the East African
Community and Another, 93 the court dealt with the lawfulness of the detention of Ugandan prisoners charged with treason. Jurisdiction of the court over human rights matters was challenged by the respondents, who contended that no such jurisdiction had been granted in terms of the EAC Treaty. The court held that despite this limitation on its power, the dispute fell under EAC law; hence a decision could be made. The extension of the court's authority into the realm of human rights went beyond the ordinary scope of the EACJ's work. However, it highlights the progressive nature of the court's decision-making, which fact could be useful in encouraging a more independent role for the TFTA tribunal. This is a direct contrast to the political interference occasioned in the Nyong'o case. Nonetheless, the test of the continued independence of the court still remains to be seen. Ground-breaking judgments tend to aggravate state parties.
(c) The SADC Tribunal
The SADC Trade Protocol is the primary determinant of the SADC economic agenda. The SADC Tribunal was established to interpret the provisions of the SADC Treaty and to adjudicate on any disputes arising out of its provisions and those of subsidiary instruments. 95 The Tribunal was made up of ten members of high judicial standing in their countries of origin, appointed for a five-year term renewable for the same period upon expiry if the first term. 96 Five of these were regular members, while the others acted as a pool from which substitutes for regular members who were unable to execute their duties could be drawn. 97 The Tribunal could be constituted by three judges. 98 It only sat when cases were submitted to it. 99 Such a model for the appointment and service of judges would be a convenient solution for cases where time and resource constraints arise, leading to delays in the judicial process.
According to the SADC Treaty, the Tribunal could give advisory opinions at the request of the SADC Summit or Council. The decisions of the Tribunal were deemed to be final and binding. 106 This is remarkable in that the Tribunal was further directed to develop its own case law with due regard to general principles of international law. 107 Such a ground-breaking directive was good in that it allowed the court to create its own precedents and develop community law in such a way that progressive justice could be occasioned.
However, this provision was also to prove to be the Achilles heel of the Tribunal through the challenge that arose in the cases relating to Zimbabwe's land reform programme.
In .
VII CONCLUSION
The advent of the TFTA will go a long way towards achieving the dream of an African Economic Community. However, prior to that, a number of issues need to be resolved first. Some states which form part of the three RECs are not part of the TFTA negotiations -for instance -Angola; hence it will be difficult to reach mutually viable solutions. The fact that not all states are participating fully in existing RECs as well as the TFTA negotiations also militates against proper regional integration.
Some member states which will join the TFTA are not members of the WTO, hence the application of WTO law versus TFTA law will prove to be quite bothersome. The disparity in economic development, as well as trade relations, may contribute to trade animosity amongst states.
The need for an appropriate, effective dispute resolution mechanism could not be more pronounced given the challenges that are faced by the TFTA negotiating parties. Valuable lessons can be learnt in the dispute resolution realm of the existing RECs. It is hoped that the TFTA partners will be able to arrive at mutually agreeable solutions following effective dispute resolution procedures. Being a new court, however, the TFTA mechanism will likely take a while to get off the ground and be deemed credible. Thus it would be expedient to choose cases that are not overly contentious, although this in some way curtails the carriage of justice. This is especially in light of the contentious cases involving Zimbabwe which in some way contributed to the demise of the SADC Tribunal.
A rules-based approach allows even weaker states to experience somewhat the same equality and participation at the multilateral level. Indeed, for the rules to be deemed to have an effect and acquire the respect and recognition they deserve, enforcement should be seen to not only be possible, but also effective. Use of the reverse consensus method to adopt Panel reports as in the WTO would go a long way in ensuring speedy resolution of disputes. A secretariat may have to be established to assist the dispute settlement body in executing its mandate.
Given the fact that Africa has a large informal business sector, allowing individuals to approach the tribunals for the redress of international trade disputes would be a positive step. It would be ideal as well to incorporate the exhaustion of local remedies in the TFTA prior to instituting proceedings at the regional level. Allowing appeals from national courts in order to strengthen judiciaries within the region and harmonise the judicial systems of the partners may also be a useful strategy to bolster the TFTA. This would be instrumental for the TFTA if decisions can be implemented at all levels, more so in national courts. A further dimension to this is that such a decision results in states holding each other accountable. By the same token, this could see Zimbabwe enforcing a decision against Zambia in its courts.
Consequently, member states will be unable to easily escape liability or be in contempt of court if enforcement is universalised.
The establishment of an appeal court in the TFTA would allow for greater independence of the judicial body in charge of trade dispute settlement. If support for such a move can be garnered, then the problems associated with the lack of political will to enforce or implement decisions could be avoided. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the balance between the sovereign integrity of states (a very important component of the political reality facing African countries) and the separation of powers in the super-regional institution is delicate. Many of the states involved in the formation of the TFTA are likely not interested in an extensive limit on their sovereignty. At the same time, an appeal court which binds all national courts could in fact thwart the regional integration initiative if not carefully managed. However, it is important that this be kept in mind going forward.
The parties will have to decide whether to have a permanent seat for the court. It has to be strategically located to ensure that states wishing to utilise dispute settlement procedures are not unduly burdened, given the vast area which the TFTA occupies.
Whether sittings of the judges are held will also depend on the case load which will come before the court. The SADC model of five sitting and five stand-by judges; in addition to the directive for the Tribunal to develop its own case law can be drawn from for guidance. Such appointment and service of judges would be a convenient solution for cases where time and resource constraints arise, leading to delays in the judicial process. This is a compromise which allows for expeditious hearing of cases while ensuring that the pool of judges can be called upon to hear cases. Allowing the court to create its own precedents and develop community law independently will ensure that progressive justice is occasioned.
The Nyong'o decision led to the amendment of the EAC Treaty relating to the power of the EACJ. SADC Heads of State also suspended the Tribunal after it was deemed to have over-stepped its mandate. The suspension of the Tribunal has major implications for the future of the TFTA since COMESA and the EAC have functional regional courts. The envisaged trade benefits emanating from the formation of the large trade bloc stand to be torpedoed should a trade dispute settlement mechanism not be properly framed. Such political interference in judicial decision-making may serve to curtail the powers of the court; hence the Tripartite parties should beware such intrusion and attempt to adhere to the separation of powers.
Admittedly, during the negotiation stage of the TFTA, issues of trade dispute settlement are unlikely to hold the fort for some time. However, it is important for negotiators to bear in mind that the trade rules under discussion will require interpretation and application, thus the significance of clear dispute settlement
procedures cannot be gainsaid. Whilst state sovereignty and national policy should be respected, any action which impacts negatively on the future Tripartite Dispute Settlement Body -and thereby the regional economic bloc -should be dealt a heavy blow to guard against the demise of an intra-regional court.
While the establishment of a rules-based mechanism is laudable, policies and training on the ground need to be formulated to support the institutional apparatus. It is not enough to only have institutions; their effective running requires a lot more than just institutional structures. The political will to ensure that decisions are carried forward and implemented effectively in line with the overall goals of the TFTA is essential in guaranteeing the continued existence and respect for the dispute settlement body. Educational initiatives may also be necessary to allow TFTA officials to empower those involved in trade processes people regarding the avenues for redress available to them in the TFTA. The peaceful settlement of disputes is an important contributor to the success of the judicial body which will be inaugurated. In this way, the regional court can play a big role in fostering confidence in the viability of regional integration initiatives as well as allowing disgruntled parties the opportunity to seek redress where conflicts have arisen.
